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Abstract
We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider
a setting with independent private and persistent values.
We analyze three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. In the
minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction.
In equilibrium the allocation is efficient and the minimal disclosure regime does not give rise to
pooling equilibria. In contrast, in disclosure settings where either all or only the winner’s bids
are public, an inefficient pooling equilibrium with low revenues exists.

∗

We gratefully acknowledge financial support from NSF SES 0851200 and ICES 1215808. We thank the editor,
Philipp Kircher and three anonymous referees for many helpful and productive suggestions. We would like to thank
seminar participants at the NBER Market Design Meeting, University of Mannheim, University of Munich and the
University of Pennsylvania for their constructive comments. Lastly, thanks to Yi Chen for excellent research assistance.
†
Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, dirk.bergemann@yale.edu
‡
Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, johannes.horner@yale.edu

1

1

Introduction

1.1

Motivation

Information revelation policies vary wildly across auction formats. In the U.S. procurement
context, as a consequence of the “Freedom of Information Act,” the public sector is generally subject
to strict transparency requirements that require full disclosure of the identity of the bidders and the
terms of each bid. In auctions of mineral rights to U.S. government-owned land, however, only the
winner’s identity is revealed. In many markets, only the winner’s bid and identity are disclosed. This
is the case, for instance, in the mussels sealed-bid auction documented by Kleijnen and Schaik (2007),
and also happens in some European procurement auctions (for instance, in the London bus routes
auctions, see Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006)). This is also, by the very design of the auction, the
bidders’ feedback in Dutch or English auctions. In some markets, even less information is disclosed.
Over the last two years, the online auction site eBay has progressively moved toward a less transparent
auction format. Bidders’ identities are no longer disclosed, although it remains possible to determine
the list of items won in the last month by any of the (anonymous) user identities. Auction houses
like Christie’s or Sotheby’s often preserve the anonymity of the winning bidder, and sometimes of
the transaction amount. But the pinnacle of opaqueness surely belongs to Google for its sponsored
search auction, in which even the algorithm based on which the winner is determined is unknown.
To add to this confusion, some B2B auction platforms (for instance, FreeMarkets, or Covisint) offer
their clients the possibility to choose how transparent, or opaque, they wish the auction format to
be.
Undoubtedly, the choice of such feedback policies reflects a variety of considerations, such as
security, privacy, risk of corruption, etc. This paper focuses on the impact of these policies on
bidders’ strategies, efficiency and revenue. We consider infinitely repeated first-price auctions, with
persistent, independent private values, and multi-unit demand. We shall consider three information
policies. With unobservable bids, bidders are only privately informed at the end of each round
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whether they have won the auction or not. With observable bids, all bids are disclosed at the end
of each round. Finally, with winner-only observable bids, only the winner’s bid (and, although it
plays no role, his identity) is publicly disclosed at the end of each round. In terms of the disclosure
policies, we therefore focus on the provision of past bidding information for future auction events.
This should be viewed as distinct from the provision of bidding information within a single auction,
a topic of central interest for the comparison of the English or Dutch auctions to standard sealed bid
auctions, see Milgrom and Weber (1982). Thus, our concern for transparency is narrowly focused
on the amount feedback given about past auction events. But importantly, the rules of the bidding
game, namely the first price auction, are commonly known among the bidders, and thus we are not
concerned with transparency with respect to the rules of the game.
As we investigate a bidding game with an infinite horizon, as in any infinitely repeated game,
collusive equilibria exist if bidders are sufficiently patient, even under the most restrictive feedback
policy.1 Bid rotation, for instance, is always a possibility. To evaluate the intrinsic performance of
each policy absent any tacit but explicit collusion, we focus on Markov equilibria, in which strategies
only depend on bidders’ beliefs.
Providing more information to the bidders about the competing bids has conflicting effects. If
more information about bids is disclosed, bidders have an incentive to submit low bids to mimic
bidders with low valuations, and induce high valuation bidders to lower their bid so as to win more
easily in later periods. This is the familiar ratchet effect that suggests that more information is bad
for revenue. On the other hand, if less information is provided, a winning bidder has an incentive to
lower his bid to learn more about his opponents’ bids. If these bids were observable, such a discovery
process would be futile, but when the bids of the losers’ remain undisclosed, it becomes valuable: to
determine how low he can bid and still win, a past winner has an incentive to depress his bids. This
learning effect suggests that less information is bad for revenue. While both effects are present in
our model, we shall see that the first one clearly dominates the second as the discount factor tends
to one.
1

At least as long as feasible allocations exist that guarantee each player his minmax payoff, see Section 4.
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Of the three policies, the policy of unobservable bids is the most challenging to analyze, but it
is also probably the most interesting one. Because bidding histories are private, higher-order beliefs
arise naturally. A past winner’s belief about his opponents’ value naturally depends on the bid with
which he has won (winning with a very high bid, for instance, is not very informative). But losers
have not observed the winning bid, and so, based on their losing bid, they must form beliefs not
only about the winner’s private value, but also about the winner’s beliefs about the other bidders’
values. In turn, because the losing bids are not observed, the winner must therefore form beliefs about
the losers’ beliefs about his belief, etc. Therefore, the relevant state space is the rather formidable
universal belief space introduced by Mertens and Zamir (1985). To have any hope at making some
progress, we restrict attention throughout to binary valuations. Even then, establishing equilibrium
existence, let alone uniqueness, is rather difficult.
Fortunately, it is possible to explicitly construct a Markov equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
high-valuation bidders always bid strictly more than low-valuation bidders, so that the allocation is
efficient. The high-valuation bidder who wins in the initial period cautiously decreases his bids over
time, trading-off the opportunity of winning with a slightly lower bid with the risk of losing and,
more importantly, of generating mutual knowledge that he is not the only high-valuation bidder,
which leads to higher future bids. As we show, a high-valuation bidder who loses in the initial period
does not need to increase his later bids. In equilibrium, such a bidder can expect the winner to come
down with his bids over time. In fact, it turns out that submitting bids that are constant over time is
optimal for such a bidder. We provide closed-form expressions for the equilibrium strategies, which
allows us to study expected revenue and perform comparative statics. In particular, we show that,
as the discount factor goes to one, or equivalently, if auctions are repeated frequently enough, this
revenue approaches the revenue of the optimal auction (without reserve price).
In contrast, when bidders have more feedback, a low-revenue pooling equilibrium might exist,
which is impossible under unobservable bids. With winner-only observable bids, this pooling equilibrium is not unique. Indeed, there always exists a separating equilibrium whose revenue also tends
to the maximal revenue as the discount factor goes to one. In contrast, with observable bids, the
4

existence of a pooling equilibrium rules out the possibility of a separating equilibrium.
In the comparison of the minimal, the maximal and the intermediate disclosure policy, we establish
in Proposition 1 that the policy of minimal information disclosure renders a pooling equilibrium
impossible. In contrast, under the more transparent information policies, a low revenue pooling
equilibrium always existed as long as the number of bidders and the discount factor were not too low,
as established in Proposition 3 and 5. In fact, under the maximal disclosure policy, we established
that with a sufficiently large number of competitors an efficient, separating equilibrium ceased to
exist, see Proposition 2. In contrast, under minimal disclosure, we proved the existence of an efficient
separating equilibrium by construction, even though the bidders ceased to have common knowledge
of beliefs after the initial bidding period. The combination of these results then lends support to
minimal information disclosure, both from an efficiency and from a revenue maximizing point of view.
The equilibria in the distinct disclosure regimes can alternatively be cast in terms of the “ratchet
effect”. The private information of each bidder is completely persistent and hence each bidder
attempts to use (and hence hide or reveal) his private information optimally over the course of the
bidding game. In the canonical analysis of the ratchet effect, the strategic environment is described by
the relationship between the agent (with private information) and the principal (without commitment
power). In the current auction environment, the seller is the principal, and is actually committed to
the first price auction format. By contrast to the canonical model, there are many competing agents,
the bidders, which lack in commitment in the sense that each bidder optimally adapts his present
bid to the past bidding data. Thus, the ratchet effect appears as each bidder seeks to optimally
use his private information against his competitors. The pooling strategy, and the resulting pooling
equilibrium, is then the result of the ratchet effect in the competitive bidding environment. Yet, in the
competitive environment, the ratchet effect is weakened by the competition among the bidders. Each
bidder can increase his probability of winning only by increasing his bid and hence reveal additional
information about his valuation. Importantly, the strength of the ratchet effect is affected by the
disclosure regime. If the disclosure regime does not reveal all the past bidding data, the inference
and hence the effectiveness of each strategy is impacted.
5

We interpret these findings as consistent with the common wisdom that more transparency is
likely to hurt revenue. For instance, OECD guidelines for public procurement state that “disclosing
information such as the identity of the bidders and the terms and conditions of each bid allow
competitors to detect deviations from a collusive agreement, punish those firms and better coordinate
future tenders” (see OECD (2008)). Note, however, that, as mentioned, our findings do not rely on
explicit collusion. The observable bids format is inherently more collusive than the unobservable
bids format. Our analysis thus supports empirical findings, such as those of Albaek, Mollgard,
and Overgaard (1997), and experimental findings, such as those of Cason, Kannan, and Siebert
(2009), showing how finer public feedback may lead to lower revenues (and in experiments, pooling
behavior). But our analysis also indicates that such findings must be interpreted with care, as the
lower revenues need not be evidence of explicit collusion, but rather, of necessary adjustments in
light of a new environment. In the words of Dave McCormick, Senior Vice President of FreeMarkets
Inc., “suppliers are finding that, in a transparent environment where competitors can see each others’
bids, the price for goods is being driven down.” (Wilson (2000)). A second caveat is that it is not
necessary to suppress all information to obtain efficiency. With winner-only observable bids, an
efficient, high-revenue equilibrium exists as well. Simply, this equilibrium is not unique, and given
this multiplicity, it should then come as no surprise that the impact of feedback might be limited
in some settings, as, for instance, in Cramton and Schwartz (2002). Our bidding dynamics under
unobservable bids are also consistent with the experimental results of Selten and Buchta (1999), who
find that winner’s bids tend to be lowered or not to be increased, while losers’ bids tend to increase
or not to be lowered over time.
We should be clear that other considerations affect the choice of transparency. Collusion and
corruption do not only involve buyers, but also auctioneers. It is intuitively clear that too much
opaqueness facilitates corruption of the auctioneer by the buyers. More generally, the auctioneer
must be trusted to follow the auction rules that he adopts. Yet it is not hard to see how, even in
first-price auctions, an auctioneer could take advantage from naive bidders by allocating the unit to
the low bidder in a given period, in order to make the high bidder more aggressive in his future bids.
6

It is less clear whether such manipulation can be profitable if bidders understand the auctioneer’s
incentives. Google’s choice not to fully disclose its rules for sponsored search auctions, mentioned in
the introduction, raises then an interesting puzzle.

1.2

Related Literature

There are a number of recent contributions in auction theory that consider similar information
environments. Landsberger, Rubinstein, Wolfstetter, and Zamir (2001) analyze the first-price auction
in a static environment when only the ranking of the valuations is common knowledge. Their analysis
is motivated by the information revealed through the interaction in repeated bidding environments.
The main focus of their paper is the analysis of the specific asymmetric auction environment that
results when two bidders, possibly starting with the same common prior over the valuation, receive
additional information about their ranking with respect to their competitor. In a model with a
continuum of valuations, they establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. They also show, by example, that the equilibrium bidding strategies can typically not
be expressed as an analytic function, due to a singularity in the bidding function at the lower end of
the valuations.
Fevrier (2003) extends the analysis of Landsberger, Rubinstein, Wolfstetter, and Zamir (2001)
from 2 to n bidders. He then compares the revenue generated by the sale of two identical units of
an object in the sequential auction over two periods to the revenue when the units are sold as a
bundle in a single auction. Fevrier (2003) establishes that the revenue in the static auction of the
bundle yields a higher revenue than the sequential auction with or without the announcement of
the winner in the first period. Yao (2007) analyzes the equilibrium in a two-period model when the
winning bidder and the winning bid is revealed after the first period. In particular, he finds that
the initial bids in the two-period model are uniformly lower than the bids in the static first-price
auction. Tu (2007) compares the revenue properties of a number of auction formats and disclosure
policies in a two-period setting. In particular, he establishes revenue comparisons when the valuation
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of the buyers are uniformly distributed. Notably, he finds that with respect to a number of possible
disclosure policies in the first-price auction, announcing the winning bid yields a higher revenue than
announcing the winning and the losing bid. In turn, the revenue from the public announcement of
the bids yields a higher revenue than the announcement of the determination of winner and loser
in the past auction. Thomas (2010) also compares different disclosure policies within a two period
model with two possible types for each bidder. By imposing a reserve price at the low valuation, he
restricts attention to separating equilibria in which low valuation bidders never submit bids at all.
This restriction completely removes the possibility of pooling equilibria in the analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the rules of
information disclosure. Section 3 considers the equilibrium bidding strategies with unobservable bids.
It explicitly constructs an equilibrium in separating strategies and establishes comparative statics.
Section 4 considers the environment with observable bids. Section 5 analyzes the equilibrium when
only the bid of the winner is observable. Section 6 concludes and Section 7, the Appendix, collects
the remaining proofs.

2

The Model

2.1

Three Variations on a Theme

There are n + 1 ≥ 2 bidders, or players, competing in an infinite sequence of auctions. In every
period t = 0, 1, . . ., a single unit is sold via a first-price sealed bid auction. There is no reserve price,
and ties are broken randomly. Bidders have quasilinear preferences that are additively separable
across periods. A player’s valuation ui , or type, is constant across time and private information.
Valuations are binary: bidder i’s type is either high and equal to ū or low, equal to u. Types are
drawn independently across bidders, and the probability that bidder i’s valuation is ū is q ∈ (0, 1).
The same n+1 bidders participate in all these auctions, and both the number of bidders, and the type
distribution, are common knowledge among bidders. These assumptions, discussed in the conclusion,
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are quite restrictive (in particular, the binary valuations of the bidders), but it will become clear that
relaxing them appears difficult in the case in which bids are not observable.2
Thus, the reward rti in period t of player i with valuation ui is equal to ui − bit if he bids bit and he
wins the object, or to 0 if he does not win. Bidders discount future periods with a common discount
factor δ < 1. The realized payoff of a bidder is the average discounted sum of his rewards:
∞
X

(1 − δ)δ t rti .

t=0

Our purpose is to compare different information policies available to the auctioneer. In all cases,
every individual bidder is privately informed, at the end of any given period, whether he has won
the unit in that period or not. We compare three scenarios:
1. In the unobservable case, bids are not disclosed. The identity of the winner is not disclosed
either. Of course, if n + 1 = 2, a bidder can infer who won from his own information (whether
he won or lost), but this is no longer the case with more bidders.
2. In the observable case, the auctioneer discloses who bid how much. This is the case of perfect
monitoring, and bidders accordingly update their beliefs about the valuations of others.
3. In the winner-only observable case, the bid of the winning bidder is announced. Although this
turns out to be irrelevant for our analysis, we also assume that the winner’s identity is disclosed.
Nothing else is disclosed.
In a repeated game such as ours, even with incomplete information, there is a myriad of equilibria.
For instance, there are collusive equilibria that involve bid rotation, and a winning bid of zero in
every period, which are easy to support if u > 0, independently of the structure of the uncertainty.
Because we are not interested in collusion per se, we focus on Markov equilibria, in which players’
strategies only depend on payoff-relevant information.
2

With more than two values, the Markov assumption also loses its bite in the arguably simpler case of observable
bids, i.e., the equilibrium outcome is no longer unique –not much of a surprise given the leeway in specifying out-ofequilibrium beliefs. See Hörner and Jamison (2008) for a discussion of such examples in a related environment.
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What information is payoff-relevant in our environment is tricky. In the observable case, players’
beliefs (about others’ values) are public after every history, and we take these beliefs as the state
variable. A similar definition is possible in the winner-only observable case. This, however, is difficult
in the unobservable case. For instance, a winner infers from his bid how high his opponents’ bids
could be, and this affects his beliefs about their valuations. His beliefs, however, are no longer
common knowledge, because his bid is not. Because a loser can only deduce a lower bound on the
winner’s bid from his own bid, the loser has beliefs about the winner’s beliefs, and they are certainly
payoff-relevant from his viewpoint. We are therefore led to consider the universal type space (see
Mertens and Zamir (1985)) as the natural state space for our definition of Markov strategies.
But first, let us define precisely the bidders’ information and strategies in each scenario.

2.2

Histories and Strategies

Even under complete information, it is often convenient to introduce infinitesimal bids in order
to avoid complications linked to real numbers: if bidder 1 is known to be of value u, and bidder 2 is
known to be of value ū, it is natural, in the one-shot game, to focus on the equilibrium in which bidder
1 bids u and bidder 2 bids “as little as possible” above u. Of course, there is no such bid in the field
of real numbers. To avoid this difficulty, one can resort to richer strategies, as in Blume (2003), to
endogenous tie-breaking rules, as in Jackson, Swinkels, Simon, and Zame (2002), or to arbitrarily fine
but discrete bid grids, as in Chwe (1989). As a convention, we shall follow here Engelbrecht-Wiggans
(1983) and Hörner and Jamison (2008) and assume that there is such a bid u+ , which costs just as
much as u, but that is strictly larger, while being strictly smaller than any real number b > u.
i
A private history of player i up to period t is a sequence (bi0 , k0i , . . . , bit−1 , kt−1
), consisting of the

bids bit′ ∈ R+ ∪ {u+ } that he made in period t′ , and of his personal outcome in that period: kti′ = 0
if bidder i did not win the object in period t′ , and kti′ = 1 if he won the object. A private history of
player i up to period t is denoted hit ∈ Hti := ((R+ ∪ {u+ }) × {0, 1})t.
In the unobservable case, this is the only information available to player i, and a (behavior)
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strategy σ i is then simply a countable sequence of transition probabilities σ it : {u, u} × Hti → △(R+ ∪
{u+ }), mapping bidder i’s valuation and private history into a distribution over bids.
In the observable case, bidder i knows the entire sequence of bids in each period up to t. The
public history up to period t is thus a sequence ((b10 , . . . , bn0 ), j0 , . . . , (b1t , . . . , bnt ), jt ), with (b1t′ , . . . , bnt′ ) ∈
j

(R+ ∪ {u+ })n , and jt′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where bt′t′ := maxi bit′ . Of course, the identity jt′ of the winner in
period t′ can be inferred from the ordered bid tuple (unless there is a tie). The public history up to
t is denoted ht ∈ Ht := ((R+ ∪ {u+ })n × {1, . . . , n})t . (Set H0i := {∅}, H0 := {∅}.)
w
In the winner-only observable case, a public history up to t is a sequence (bw
0 , j0 , . . . , bt−1 , jt−1 ) of
′
winning bids bw
t′ in period t , and of the identity of the winning bidder in that period: jt′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}

refers to the winning bidder in that period. The set of public histories Ht in this case is equal to
((R+ ∪ {u+ }) × {1, . . . , n})t . For consistency, we set Ht := {∅}, all t, in the unobservable case, so
that we may talk about the three scenarios in a unified way.
A behavior strategy σ i for player i in the observable case or the winner-only observable case is
again a countable sequence of transition probabilities σ it : {u, u}×Hti ×Ht → △(R+ ∪{u+ }), mapping
bidder i’s valuation, along with the private and public history up to period t, into a distribution over
bids.

2.3

Solution Concept

A strategy profile σ = (σ i )i defines a probability distribution Pσ over infinite histories in the obvious way, and we can therefore define player i’s payoff under the strategy profile σ as the expectation
of his realized payoff relative to this distribution
V i (σ) = Eσ

"∞
X
t=0

#

(1 − δ)δ t rti .

Fix some strategy profile σ. Given the common prior on bidders’ valuations, and given any pair
of private and public histories (hit , ht ) that are in the support of the distribution Pσ , Bayes’ rule
determines bidder i’s beliefs about the other bidders’ valuations and their private histories hjt , j 6= i.
11

This in turn defines a conditional distribution Pσ|(hit ,ht ) over the sequence of future rewards, and we
can define the continuation payoff of player i after (hit , ht ) as
V i (σ|(hit , ht )) = Eσ|(hit ,ht )

"∞
X
t′ =t

(1 − δ)δ

t′ −t

#

rti′ .

We may then define a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (or PBE, for short) as a strategy profile σ in
which players’ strategies σ i are sequentially rational after every pair (hit , ht ) given their beliefs, and
these beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule if this pair is in the support of Pσ .
As mentioned, we are not interested in characterizing all PBE. It is natural to focus on Markov
equilibria, in which players’ strategies are measurable with respect to their beliefs. However, we have
seen that, at least in the unobservable case, attention cannot be restricted to first-order beliefs; even
if player i conditions on j being of the high type, he cannot infer player j’s first-order beliefs from his
own private history hit , because player j’s high type might randomize over bids, and what determines
j’ first-order beliefs is the realization of these bids, i.e. player j’s private history. We are thus led
to adopt as state space for player i the universal belief space Θi (see Mertens and Zamir (1985)),
which is compact and metric. Given the strategy profile σ, a pair of histories (hit , ht ) in the support
of Pσ defines a belief θi ∈ Θi via Bayes’ rule. Player i’s strategy is Markov if it is measurable with
respect to these beliefs. It is natural to further impose that player i’s strategy is also measurable
with respect to his belief θi off-path as well, even if these beliefs are no longer determined by Bayes’
rule. A Markov strategy is then summarized by a measurable map σ i : Θi → △(R+ ∪ {u+ }), and a
Markov equilibrium (hereafter, MSE) is a PBE in Markov strategies. In the observable case, these
hierarchies of beliefs are trivial, and they turn out to simple in the case of winner-only observable
bids as well. They are, however, more complicated in the unobservable case.
Because of the arbitrariness of the specification of beliefs off-path, these beliefs can be used to
threaten players, so that the Markov restriction does not reduce the set of equilibria as much as one
would like to. Consider for instance the observable case with two bidders. Fix some history after
which it is commonly believed that the two bidders have low valuations. It would be natural, then,
12

to conjecture that in a Markov equilibrium, after such a history, both bidders set their bid equal to
u in every period. But any lower common bid would do as well, as long as the equilibrium specifies
that any higher bid will lead to a belief revision. For instance, if bidder i observes j bidding more,
we could specify that i now believes that j has a high valuation after all, and then bids u thereafter.
This deters any deviation. To prune such artificial equilibria, we impose the following refinement.
Refinement A:
1. After any history ((hit )i , ht ), low-type bidders bid u in every period.
2. After any history ((hit )i , ht ) such that it is common knowledge among at least two high-type
bidders that they are both high-type bidders, those two high-type bidders bid ū thereafter.
The first restriction is a combination of two assumptions. First, a low-type bidder does not use
a weakly dominated strategy, such as bidding strictly more than u. Second, all bids are at least as
high as the lowest commonly known value (while (1.) does not impose that the high-type bidder bids
at least u, it is easy to see that it will imply it). Note that the second part of the refinement does
not require that the two high-type bidders know their respective identities. Rather, it suffices that it
be common knowledge among them that they exist. Still, Refinement A will not ensure uniqueness,
but it will help narrow down the set of candidate equilibria considerably.
Note that we have now pinned down, by assumption, the equilibrium behavior of the low-type
bidder. Therefore, the difficulty lies in identifying the behavior of the high-type bidder.

2.4

The Static Auction

We conclude this section with a brief review of the static first-price auction, with n + 1 bidders,
i = 1, . . . , n + 1, two possible valuations each, ui ∈ {u, u}, and identical and independent priors
given by 1 − q and q, respectively. With discrete, here binary, valuations, the unique equilibrium
of the first-price auction involves randomization by the high-valuation bidder (see Maskin and Riley
(2003)). His bid has to balance the probability of a winning bid against the price paid conditional
13

on winning. The unconditional distribution of bids from each of his competitors is denoted by F (b).
Every bid in the support of the random bidding strategy must maximize the expected payoff
F (b)n (u − b) .

Indifference of the high-valuation bidder requires that the right-hand side be independent of b, i.e.

F (b) = (1 − q)



u−u
u−b

1/n

,

(1)

where the support of the distribution is given by [u, ū − (1 − q)n (ū − u)]. The distribution displays
a mass point at the lower extremity of the support, where F (u) = (1 − q)n reflects the fact that the
low-valuation bidder makes a deterministic bid equal to his valuation. In contrast, the high-valuation
bidder continuously randomizes on (u, ū − (1 − q)n (ū − u)]. The low-valuation bidder receives zero net
payoff, while the high-valuation bidder receives a positive payoff, given by (1 − q)n (u − u). In the
first-price auction, each type’s payoff is equal to his payoff from the second-price auction. Yet, with
discrete types, the revenue equivalence theorem fails, and revenue might differ across mechanisms
that are efficient and yield no surplus to the low-type bidder. We shall encounter such mechanisms.
However, the allocation from the first-price auction maximizes revenue among efficient mechanisms.

3

Unobservable Bids
We begin our analysis with the case of unobservable bids.

3.1

On the Impossibility of Pooling

An equilibrium is pooling if, on the equilibrium path, bidders of different valuations use the same
bidding strategy, so that, equivalently, beliefs do not change. Note that, if the strategies of the bidders
act to separate types, then a high-valuation bidder will (eventually) win against a low-valuation
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bidder. In the process of separation, the high-valuation bidder also reveals his true valuation and
consequently might be forced into an eventual competition with another high-valuation competitor
that will leave both of them with no surplus. From this point of view, a pooling equilibrium might
seem desirable for the bidders, especially when the probability that a bidder has a high valuation
is high, and when bidders are patient. Indeed, such equilibria will arise under other information
structures, as we shall see. Pooling implies that the surplus must be shared, in particular with
low-valuation bidders. The benefit is that the price remains low.
Consider then such a candidate pooling equilibrium. As the bids are not observable, any loss can
be attributed to pure chance (given the random tie-breaking) and does not lead to a revision of the
prior. This opens the door for a high-valuation bidder to bid slightly more than the pooling bid and
to win the current auction for sure. As beliefs of the agents are unchanged, the current benefit comes
without a future cost, and this represents a profitable deviation.
Proposition 1 (Impossibility of Pooling).
For all q, n, δ, a pooling Markov equilibrium does not exist with unobservable bids.
Refinement A is not necessary for Proposition 1. To see this, note first that a pooling equilibrium
must involve pure strategies, because it is not possible, given single-crossing, that low- and hightype bidders are simultaneously indifferent over two bids (i.e., over two distinct probabilities of
winning: the probability of winning in the continuation equilibrium must be independent of this bid,
by the Markov assumption, and by the fact that the observed bid does not affect beliefs in a pooling
equilibrium). This pooling bid must (at least in some period) be no larger than u, else the low-type
bidder would make negative profits. Pick any such period, and apply the argument above.
Having established the impossibility of pooling in a Markov equilibrium, we now proceed to
construct a specific separating equilibrium.
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3.2

The Separating Equilibrium: Preview

In a separating equilibrium, low- and high-valuation bidders’ strategies have disjoint supports,
which allows some learning to take place. Of course, with unobservable bids, this learning might
be incomplete. For instance, a high-valuation bidder that wins in the initial period only infers that
his opponents have bid less than he did, but that does not allow him to ascertain his opponents’
valuation for sure. He simply updates his beliefs given his winning bid. So do the losing bidders,
given their losing bids. Further, the losing bidders revise their beliefs about the winner’s beliefs, but
because they do not know the winning bid, this leads to a subtle updating process.
We shall circumvent these difficulties as follows. Recall that low-valuation bidders bid u throughout, so the focus is on the high-valuation bidders. The separating equilibrium we shall construct has
the following properties:
1. In the initial period, high-valuation bidders continuously randomize over the support [u+ , b0 ],
for some b̄0 > u+ . This partitions the set of bidders according to their status after the initial
period, as “winner” and “losers.” We shall refer to a bidder as the winner entering period t if
he won in all periods up to t, and as a loser if he lost in all those periods.
2. In later periods, as long as the (initial) winner has never lost, as a function of their initial
bid, (high-valuation) bidders submit bids that decrease over time.3 Both the (high-valuation)
winner and the loser always bid strictly more than u, but, depending on his initial bid, the
winner might bid u+ . More precisely, for every period, there exists a range of bids in [u+ , b0 ],
that includes u+ , such that, if the winner has won in the initial period with a bid in this range,
then his bid in period t and beyond is u+ . The support of the bid distribution of the winner
and (high-valuation) losers is common, i.e., the highest bid that a loser could conceivably make
in a given period, i.e., the bid a loser would make if he lost in the initial period with a bid of
b0 , coincides with the bid the winner would make if he had initially won with b0 .
3

We insist that, although for convenience we describe later bids as functions of earlier bids, they are truly functions
of the bidders’ beliefs, which on the equilibrium path happen to be pinned down by their initial bid.
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We note that such an equilibrium would have the desirable feature that, as soon as a high-valuation
bidder who always won so far loses in some period t > 0, it would become common knowledge among
two bidders that there are two high-valuation bidders.4 To see this, note that the high-valuation loser
who then wins knows that there exists another high-valuation bidder, because he lost in the initial
period with a bid strictly above u. But as the winner eventually loses with a bid strictly above u, this
winner learns that there is another high-valuation bidder, and thus, that there is another bidder who
knows that there are two high-valuation bidders. Because they both know that the winner has lost in
period t, this establishes common knowledge (among them) that there are two high-valuation bidders.
By Refinement A, bids then jump up to ū, which ends the game for all practical purposes. We may
then focus on the histories in which the “winner” of the initial auction has never lost afterwards.
In such an equilibrium, the process of belief updating is simple. Assume there are two bidders.
Consider the high-valuation winner’s inference problem. Given that the loser is using a monotone
strategy, the winner’s belief can be summarized by a cut-off bid. Namely, the winner can derive
an upper bound on the bid that the loser might submit in the current period, which is the highest
bid consistent with the loser’s equilibrium strategy, given that all his bids were below the winner’s
bids until then. While the winner knows that the loser will not bid above this cut-off, his private
information gives him no further information regarding the relative likelihood of lower bids. Therefore,
a belief revision for the winner amounts to truncating (from above) the corresponding distribution.
Updating proceeds similarly for the high-valuation loser. His private history provides him with a
lower bound on the bids that the high-valuation winner might submit. Therefore, a belief revision
for the loser amounts to truncating (from below) the corresponding distribution.
The next subsection shows how to explicitly solve for the equilibrium strategies. The reader
mostly interested in the qualitative findings might elect to skip it.
4

Note, however, that with more than two bidders all but two bidders will never learn for sure whether the initial
winner has already lost, in which case there is no longer any scope for them to win.
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3.3

Deriving the Equilibrium Strategies

Fix a separating Markov equilibrium. Let Ft denotes the cumulative and unconditional distribution function (c.d.f.) summarizing the equilibrium strategy in period t of a player who always lost
up to period t − 1, and Gt the unconditional c.d.f. summarizing the equilibrium strategy in period
t of a player who always won up to period t − 1. That is, Ft captures the winner’s belief about the
bid distribution of any given loser in period t, if he had submitted in all previous periods bids with
which he was sure to win, and were thus uninformative. Similarly, Gt describes the belief about the
winner’s distribution of a loser who would have bid less than u throughout.
The distinction between winner and loser is immaterial initially, and thus G0 = F0 . Given the
properties of the separating equilibrium we seek, it must be that Ft (u) = 1 − q (recall that 1 − q
is the prior probability of a low valuation). By contrast the high-valuation bidder who won until t

might bid u+ with discrete probability, i.e. Gt (u) = 1 − q but Gt u+ ≥ 1 − q.5

In general, a player’s beliefs are pinned down by his entire private history. It turns out that the

last bid (along with the bidder’s status as winner or loser) is a sufficient statistic for this belief, at
least on the equilibrium path, on which we focus for now. Thus, we denote by Vt (b) the continuation
value of the winner with a high valuation ū, given that his last bid was b. Similarly, we denote by
Wt (b) the continuation value of a loser with a high valuation ū, given that his last bid was b. We
emphasize that this is just a convenient short-hand for the player’s beliefs.
The derivation below is performed for the case of two bidders. This makes the exposition somewhat easier. Results, however, are stated for n + 1 bidders, with proofs in Appendix.
3.3.1

The Loser’s Bidding Strategy

We start by determining the equilibrium bid distribution Ft of the loser for all periods t ≥ 1.
The bid distribution Ft of the loser is determined by the indifference condition of the winner. His
5

To avoid clutter, we shall just omit the distinction between Gt (u) and Gt (u+ ), with the convention that Gt (u) −
(1 − q) is the probability assigned to the bid u+ , as the probability assigned to u is 1 − q throughout.
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continuation value is given by the optimality equation

Vt (b) = max
β




Ft (β)
[(1 − δ)(ū − β) + δVt+1 (β)] ,
Ft−1 (b)

t ≥ 1.

(2)

The winner receives the object in period t with a bid β > u if and only if the loser makes a bid below
β.6 The ratio Ft (β)/Ft−1 (b) is the conditional belief of the winner, and is obtained by truncation of
his original, unconditional belief, as explained above. The unconditional probability of a bid below
β is given by Ft (β). The winner received the object in the preceding period with a bid b, hence he
can condition his bid β today on the information that the loser made a bid below b yesterday (this,
as it turns out, is finer information than the one contained in his earlier bids). If, for instance, he
makes the bid β t (b) that the loser would submit after bidding b in period t − 1, he would win with
probability Ft (β t (b))/Ft−1 (b) = 1, because, given monotonicity, Ft (β t (b)) = Ft−1 (b), by definition of
β t (b). The winner has no incentive to bid more than β t (b), since this bid suffices to win for sure.
In the case of a winning bid β, the winner receives the object today at the price β and maintains
his status as winner for at least another period. By contrast, if he loses the auction today, then it is
common knowledge among the bidders that they both have a high valuation. Hence, by Refinement
A, all future bids will be equal to ū and exhaust all surplus from the bidders’ point of view.
We define Yt (b) to be the expected future utility from a bid b in the preceding period, so

Yt (b) := Ft−1 (b) Vt (b) .

(3)

This allows to rewrite the value function of the winner as

Yt (b) /(1 − δ) = max {Ft (β) (ū − β) + δYt+1 (β) /(1 − δ)} ,
β

6

t ≥ 1,

(4)

Implicitly, here and in the winner’s problem, we restrict the domain of the choice variable β to the range of values
that will preserve the feature that the last bid is a sufficient statistic for the entire past, and for which the ratio
Ft (β)/Ft−1 (b) is less than one, i.e. such that β ≤ β t (b). We will then verify that the strategy profile obtained in this
manner is an equilibrium.
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so that the unconditional distribution Ft−1 of the preceding period t − 1 no longer appears. Note
that the right-hand side no longer depends on b, so that Yt (b) does not either. That is, Yt (b) is
constant, and the last term on the right-hand side, Yt+1 (β), must be as well. Thus, the first term of
the right-hand side must be constant over the support of Ft , and so

Ft (b) =

ϕt
,
ū − b

t ≥ 1,

for some constant ϕt . Since the equilibrium we seek to identify satisfies Ft (u) = 1−q for all t ≥ 1, the
constant ϕt is given by ϕt = ϕ := (1 − q) (ū − u), independently of t for t ≥ 1. We record below the
equilibrium strategy for the loser in case that there are n + 1 bidders, as an immediate generalization
of the formula above (see (37) in Appendix).
Lemma 1 (The Loser’s Bid Distribution).
The loser’s bid distribution is given by, for all t ≥ 1,

Ft (b) = F (b) := (1 − q)



ū − u
ū − b

1/n

,

(5)

on the support [u, ū − (1 − q)n (ū − u)]. Thus, the loser makes a constant bid from t ≥ 1 onward.
Equation (4) provides a simple difference equation for the sequence {Yt }t of unconditional payoffs,
namely, Yt /(1 − δ) = ϕ + δYt+1 /(1 − δ), whose unique bounded solution is

Yt = ϕ = (1 − q)(ū − u),

(6)

which is independent of time and of the past bid b. With the solution to the loser’s bid distribution
and the unconditional payoffs, given by (5) and (6), we obtain the conditional value of the winner,
Vt (b), by using the equation (3) as: Vt (b) = ū − b. Using the recursion of the value function given by
(2), it follows that the continuation value of the winner is a martingale, i.e. E [Vt+1 ] = Vt (b) = ū − b.
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3.3.2

The Winner’s Bidding Strategy

Next, we derive the winner’s unconditional bid distribution Gt , which in turn is determined by
the loser’s optimization problem. The value function Wt of the loser, as a function of his last bid,
which here as well encapsulates his belief (on the equilibrium path) satisfies the optimality equation

Wt (b) = max
β




1 − Gt (β)
Gt (β) − Gt−1 (b)
(1 − δ)(ū − β) + δ
Wt+1 (β) , t ≥ 1.
1 − Gt−1 (b)
1 − Gt−1 (b)

(7)

To understand the loser’s payoff, we must distinguish between two events. The contemporaneous bid
β > u can either win the current auction, and hence yield a reward of ū − β (after which bids jump
to ū) or it can be too low, in which case the loser remains in his loser’s status, until the subsequent
period t + 1 when he can expect a continuation value Wt+1 (β). The unconditional probability of
winning (or losing) with a bid β becomes a conditional probability by conditioning on the previous
event, in which the loser lost with b, so that the winner’s bid must have been at least as high. As
before, it is useful to restate this equation with the help of an auxiliary function. Let Xt (b) be the
expected continuation value from losing with a bid b in period t − 1, or

Xt (b) := (1 − Gt−1 (b)) Wt (b) .

(8)

With this definition, we rewrite (7) to get

Xt (b) /(1 − δ) = max {(Gt (β) − Gt−1 (b)) (ū − β) + δXt+1 (β) /(1 − δ)} , t ≥ 1.
β

(9)

The value function, described in terms of the unconditional expected values, is again more accessible
than the conditional values. But we observe that the past bid b of the loser continues to appear on
the right-hand side of the equation. First-order conditions are then
G′t (β) (ū − β) − (Gt (β) − Gt−1 (b)) +
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δ
X ′ (β) = 0,
1 − δ t+1

t ≥ 1.

(10)

Note also that, from the envelope theorem applied to (9),
Xt′ (b)/(1 − δ) = −G′t−1 (b)(ū − β).

(11)

To make further progress, some calculations will be required, and they will necessitate to distinguish
according to whether t is equal to, or larger than 1. As we learned earlier (see (5)), the equilibrium
bid of the loser is constant across periods for t ≥ 1, or bt = bt+1 , so that the first-order condition
must hold for the choice β = b. It follows that we can describe the bidding behavior in terms of
contemporaneous bid b alone for all periods t > 1, i.e., from (10),
G′t (b) (ū − b) − (Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b)) +

δ
′
Xt+1
(b) = 0.
1−δ

(12)

The property of constant bids across periods only arose in the continuation game after an initial
winner and initial loser had been determined. The relationship between the initial bid b and the bid
β after the determination of the “winner” and “loser” position respectively has yet to be established,
which is why we assume first that t ≥ 2. After forwarding the time index from t to t + 1 in (11), and
′
using the fact that β = b, we can eliminate Xt+1
(β) from (10), to obtain

(1 − δ)G′t (b)(ū − b) = Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b), t ≥ 2.

(13)

Because the support of Ft and Gt must coincide, it holds that Gt (ū) = 1. Thus, we have an ordinary
differential equation and a boundary condition that can be solved for Gt , if Gt−1 is given.
Let us turn to G1 . We have already observed that the relationship between the contemporaneous
bid β in period t = 1 and the preceding bid b in period t = 0 is more intricate than in later periods.
Recall that the optimality equation in t = 1, derived earlier in (10),states that
G′1 (β) (ū − β) − (G1 (β) − G0 (b)) +
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δ
X ′ (β) = 0.
1−δ 2

(14)

While it is no longer the case that β = b in t = 1, the hypothesis of monotone bidding strategies
allows us to relate the bid b in t = 0 to the bid β in t = 1, noting that

G0 (b) = F0 (b) = F1 (β) = (1 − q) (ū − u) / (ū − β) ,

(15)

where the final equality had been established in (5). Thus, the equations (13) and (14), along with
Gt (u) = 1, all t ≥ 1, allow us to solve recursively for the distributions Gt , t ≥ 1. The solution of
(13) and (14) is the special case for two bidders of the formula given in the following lemma, where
as before, Gt (u) − (1 − q) is the probability assigned by the high-valuation winner to the bid u+ .
Lemma 2 (The Winner’s Bid Distribution).
The winner’s bid distribution is given by, for all t ≥ 1,
t
τ
τ −t 
1 X 1 − δ
1
1
ln F (b)− 1−δ ,
Gt (b) = t F (b) + F (b) 1−δ
τ!
δ
τ =0

(16)



on the support u+ , ū − (1 − q)n (ū − u) .

Recall that the distribution F (b) refers to the loser’s bid distribution obtained in Lemma 1. It

follows from this formula that the bids of the winner are decreasing over time from t ≥ 1 onward.
3.3.3

The Bidding Strategy in the Initial Period

We are left to determine the bidding strategy in the initial period t = 0 (at this stage, the
distinction between winner and loser does not yet appear). Each high-valuation bidder maximizes

δ
δ
Y1 (b) +
X1 (b) .
max F0 (b) (ū − b) +
b
1−δ
1−δ


(17)

The bid b in the initial period determines the expected reward, as well as the continuation value, conditional on being the winner, Y1 (b), or the loser, X1 (b), where we maintain the notation, introduced
in (3) and (8), that already accounts for the probability of each event. If high-valuation bidders are
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indifferent over some interval, the profit from (17) must be independent of b over this interval. Thus,
plugging X1 (b) , Y1 (b) into (17), straightforward algebra gives that

F0 (b)(ū − b) − δ(1 − q)(ū − u) ln F0 (b) = K0 ,

(18)

for some constant K0 . This implicitly defines F0 and can be explicitly solved using the Lambert
function. The initial bid distribution at t = 0 :
ū − u
F0 (b) = (1 − q) −δ
W−1
ū − b

1

e− δ ū − b
−
δ ū − u

!!1/n

,

(19)

where W−1 is the branch -1 of the Lambert function.7 The support of this distribution is given by
[u, ū − (1 − q)n (ū − u)(1 − nδ ln(1 − q))].

Theorem 1 (Separating Equilibrium).
The initial bid distribution F0 (b) and the continuation distributions Ft (b) and Gt (b) of loser and
winner respectively form a separating Markov equilibrium.
The equilibrium strategies have only been described on path so far. The description of the
equilibrium in terms of the off path behavior is completed in the proof of Theorem 1. It uses the
fact that the initial randomization of bids in conjunction with the unobservable nature of the bids
extends the information contained in the on-path to the off-path bids. We conclude this section
by commenting on uniqueness. Our separating equilibrium is the unique such equilibrium (there
cannot be gaps, or atoms in the high-valuation bidder’s distributions, by standard arguments), and
as mentioned above, the limited monitoring gives each high-valuation bidder a strong incentive to bid
more than u. However, ruling out equilibria in which this is not the case appears daunting, because
7
The Lambert W function is the inverse function of f (x) = xex . The function f is not injective. For x ∈ R the
function is defined only for x ≥ −1/e, and is double-valued on (−1/e, 0). The alternate branch on [−1/e, 0) with
x ≤ −1 is denoted W−1 (x) and decreases from W−1 (−1/e) = −1 to W−1 (0− ) = −∞.
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any candidate equilibrium in which high-valuation bidders bid u in some periods loses the property
that uncertainty is resolved once the initial winner loses. Consequently, we would no longer be able
to elude considering continuation games characterized by less tractable belief hierarchies. Currently,
we are only able to show that the high-valuation bidder cannot be willing to bid u indefinitely.

3.4

The Separating Equilibrium: Summary

Let us sum up the main findings that were either mentioned in passing, or that follow from the
equilibrium solution described in Theorem 1. First, the bids in the initial period are lower than in the
static first-price auction. This is puzzling at first glance. After all, for every possible bid b, the winner
of the initial bidding game, has a higher continuation payoff than the loser. So it may seem that
winning the initial auction is like winning the static auction, but with an additional prize provided by
a more favorable continuation value. If the continuation value of winning or losing were independent
of the current bid, then each bidder would bid more aggressively initially as it would look like the
static auction, but with a prize larger than the flow payoff ū. But the analysis of the initial bid, given
by (17), demonstrates that continuation values depend on the information provided by the initial
bid. The payoff contribution from winning, Y1 (b), is constant in b. Since the probability of winning
is increasing in the bid, this implies that the continuation value V1 (b), conditional on winning with
b, is actually decreasing in b. By contrast, the payoff contribution X1 (b) from losing is decreasing
in b. Here, the continuation value W1 (b) from losing at higher b is not increasing sufficiently fast
to offset the lower probability of losing with a higher bid. Thus the initial bidding is less aggressive
than in the first price-auction, and initial bids are depressed.
The winner’s bid decreases over time, except at the very top, where it is constant. Figure 1 shows
how bids decrease over time with two bidders. Bids b are on the abscissa, the probability Gt (b) is on
the ordinate. Higher curves correspond to later periods. That is, the probability assigned to the bid
not exceeding a given value goes up over time, which means that over time bids go down.
The reason why the winner decreases his bid over time is clear: he cautiously explores how low
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Figure 1: Bid distribution for n = 2 in periods t = 1, . . . , 6, q = 1/3, δ = 9/10, ū = 1 = 1 − u
(bottom t = 1, top t = 6)
he can get while still winning. At some point, he is sufficiently confident that his opponents have
low valuations to submit a bid u+ , which conclusively establishes whether or not this is the case.
Formally, for fixed δ, the distribution Gt converges pointwise to δ u+ , the Dirac distribution that
assigns probability one to u+ , as t → ∞.
Given that the winner lowers his bid over time, the loser has no reason to raise his. Although
he has always lost so far, which should push him towards higher bids, he knows that the winner is
coming down with his bids, so that by not raising his bid, he will win his unit perhaps later, but at
a lower cost. The equilibrium balances these forces, and a constant bid is best.
The total discounted revenue of this dynamic auction is close to, but strictly below, the theoretical
maximum (in the absence of reserve prices) given by the static auction. To see this, note that the
outcome is efficient (a low-valuation bidder never gets the unit if there is a high valuation present),
and that the payoff of a high-valuation bidder can be computed by considering what happens if he
always makes the highest bid. In that case, he will win all units, and the price he will pay for this is
equal to ū − (1 − q)n (ū − u), as in the static auction, except in the initial period, where it is lower.
How much lower depends on the discount factor: if the bidders are very impatient (δ near zero), then
the initial bid distribution is close to the distribution in the static auction. This is not the case if
they are very patient (δ near one), but in that case, the relative importance of the first period in the
auctioneer’s revenue is negligible (assuming that he shares the same discount factor).
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Let us mention a few comparative statics, which follow from the characterization of the bid
distribution. The results are proved in the supplementary Appendix. Regarding the discount factor,
it is immediate to check that, for fixed, t, limδ→1 Gt (b) = F (b), which is equal to the distribution of
the losers’ bid, and is independent of t. More generally, for fixed t, the distribution Gt is decreasing
in δ. That is, as is intuitive, the higher the discount factor, the slower the pace at which the winner
lowers his bid over time. We summarize these observations in the next corollary.
Corollary 2 (Comparative Statics). For every q, n, δ :
1. The bids (of high valuation bidders) jump up from t = 0 to t = 1. Thereafter, they are constant
for losers, and decreasing over time for the winner.
2. For a fixed t, the losers’ bids are independent of δ and the winner’s bid is increasing in δ.
3. For a fixed t, bids increase with n, and tend to a two-point distribution on {u, ū} as n → ∞.
4. Expected revenue tends to the revenue of the static auction as δ → 1.

4

Observable Bids
We shall now turn to the case in which all bids are observable. As soon as a high-valuation

bidder submits an equilibrium bid that is not in the low-valuation bidder’s distribution support, the
game simplifies. In this continuation game, if it is commonly known that two bidders have high
valuations, then play is trivial by virtue of Refinement A. This occurs immediately, in particular, if
the equilibrium is separating, that is, if bidders with different valuations use bidding distributions
with different supports. We shall see, however, that such equilibria do not exist, unless players are
sufficiently few, or high valuations sufficiently unlikely, as we establish in the next subsection. This
provides a counterpoint to the non-existence of pooling equilibria when bids are unobservable.
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4.1

On the Difficulty of Separating

An equilibrium is separating if the bid u (which is the equilibrium bid of the low-valuation bidder)
is not an equilibrium bid for the high-valuation bidders, so that, on path, all information is disclosed
immediately. Note that this is a prerequisite for efficiency and revenue maximization.
Suppose then that a high-valuation bidder does not assign positive probability to the bid u in
the initial period. Obviously then, he will bid more. By bidding u+ , he gets (1 − q)n (ū − u). By
deviating and bidding u in this period, followed by u+ , a high-valuation bidder gets
(1 − δ)(1 − q)n (ū − u)/(n + 1) + δ((1 − q)n + (1 − δ)nq(1 − q)n−1 )(ū − u).

(20)

To understand (20), note that, by bidding u in the current period, he gets a (flow) reward only if all
his opponents have low valuations as well, and even then, he wins only with probability 1/(n + 1) an
object that is worth ū − u to him. This is the first term. In the following period, however, he will be
believed to be a low-valuation bidder, and this allows him to win one unit at a price arbitrarily close
to u provided that there are not two or more high-valuation bidders, hence the second term.
On the other hand, separation yields the same payoff as the static auction, (1 − q)n (ū − u). This
is because the continuation payoff of a high-valuation bidder is independent of the specific bid above
u that he submits, so that he has the same incentives as in the static auction, which gives him a
payoff (1 − δ)(1 − q)n (ū − u). He further gets δ(1 − q)n (ū − u) from the second period onward if it
turns out that all other bidders have low valuations.
Proposition 2 (Difficulty of Separating).
For all positive q and δ, there exists n such that for all n > n, a separating Markov equilibrium does
not exist with observable bids.
Comparing the two payoffs, we find that separation is not an equilibrium if, and only if
q ≥ q o :=

1
.
1 + (n + 1)δ
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(21)

This condition, expressed in terms of the prior probability of a high valuation is satisfied if there are
sufficiently many bidders and/or if the discount factor is sufficiently high. Proposition 2 then has to
be contrasted with Proposition 1, where we showed that with unobservable bids pooling is never an
equilibrium, and constructed a separating equilibrium for all possible values of q, δ and n.
What then is the equilibrium of the game? As will be the case, it might occur that only one
bidder reveals himself to have a high valuation, while all the other n bidders submit a bid u, pooling
thereby with the low-valuation type. As always, we must first understand this continuation game of
one-sided incomplete information before we can solve the original game. We turn now to the game
of one-sided incomplete information, as a preamble to the general analysis.

4.2

The Game of One-Sided Incomplete Information

We consider here the game in which one bidder, say bidder 1, is commonly known to have a high
valuation, while each of the other n bidders is believed to have a high valuation with probability q.
Accordingly, bidder 1 is uninformed, while all other bidders are informed.
Let FtU denote the bid distribution of the uninformed player, and FtI the common bid (unconditional) distribution of the other players. This represents a slight abuse of notation, as in a Markov
equilibrium, the state variable, i.e. the beliefs, determine the distributions, not the period. But as
there is a one-to-one correspondence between time and beliefs on the equilibrium path, using time
as an index facilitates the exposition.8 Because any equilibrium bid different from u by an informed
bidder establishes common knowledge that there is a second high-valuation bidder, after which the
game becomes trivial, we must only understand how play proceed along histories in which all informed bidders have bid u in every period so far. Let qt denote the probability that (any of) the
informed bidder’s valuation is high at the beginning of period t, given any history on the equilibrium
path in which all informed bidders bid u in all periods up to (and including) t − 1, and set q0 := q.
Note that the past bids of the uninformed bidder do not affect this belief, so that this is really a
8

To prevent any confusion, we avoid the notation F, G introduced in the unobservable case.
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function of time only. Let T ∈ N0 ∪ {+∞} denote the length of the longest such history when at
least one informed bidder has a high value; i.e., there exists no history on the equilibrium path in
which all high-value informed bidders submit bids equal to u for t > T periods.9 Finally, let b̄t denote
the highest bid in the bid support in period t ≤ T (conditional on a history in which all informed
bidders bid u throughout, a qualification we shall omit from now on). While this is a private-values
setting, this game and its solution bear strong similarities with the common-values game of Hörner
and Jamison (2008). Thus we keep the analysis concise.
Because the informed bidder always bids at least u+ (he has nothing to lose from doing so, given
the Markov assumption), a high-valuation informed bidder will not submit the bid u forever (as
he would then lose forever). Hence T < ∞. By standard arguments, the informed bidders must
randomize in period t between the bid u (at least as long as t < T ) and mixing over the interval
(u, b̄t ), for some b̄t > u. Further, the uninformed bidder must bid u+ with positive probability, for
otherwise the low-valuation bidder would be unwilling to submit bids arbitrarily close to, but above
u (such a revelation would be in vain, as it would yield a zero reward and continuation payoff).
Because the low-valuation bidder bids u for sure, Bayes’ rule tells us that the probability that an
informed bidder is of the low type in period t + 1, given such a history, is given by

1 − qt+1 =

1 − qt
,
FtI (u)

q0 = q, qT +1 = 0.

(22)

Because the reward from every bid in the interval b ∈ (u, b̄t ] must be the same (for the informed
bidder, this is because the continuation payoff is then 0; for the uninformed bidder, this follows from
the Markov assumption), we have, for all t ≤ T ,
FtU (b)FtI (b)n−1 (ū − b) = ū − b̄t = FtI (b)n (ū − b),

(23)

and so FtU (b) = FtI (b) =: Ft (b) for all b, t, where FtU (u) is the probability assigned by the uninformed
If T = +∞, there exists arbitrarily long such histories. If T < +∞, then we must have FTI (u) = 1 − qT , since the
high-valuation bidder must bid strictly more than u in that period. Hence, qT +1 = 0.
9
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bidder to u+ . Finally, because an informed bidder is indifferent between bidding just above u in
period t < T and bidding u followed (if no informed bidder bid more than u in period t) by a bid
just above u in period t + 1, we have, for all t < T ,
n
n
(u), or Ft (u) = δFt+1
(u).
Ftn (u) = δFtn−1 (u)Ft+1

(24)

The equality must be replaced by an inequality in period T , i.e., FT (u) ≥ δ. Equations (22)–(24)
then allow us to solve for the equilibrium.10 Given a prior belief q < 1, it follows from (24) that, as
δ → 1, T → ∞ and δ T → 1 for T = T (q). That is, uncertainty is resolved arbitrarily fast relative
to δ, although the time it might take (in fact, the expected time it takes) grows without bound. We
can summarize our findings as follows.
Lemma 3 (Bidding with One-Sided Information and Observable Bids).
1. The equilibrium bid distribution Ft (b) is increasing in t for all b (i.e., the uninformed bidder’s
bids decrease on average).
2. (At least) one informed high-valuation bidder reveals his type by period T < ∞, where limδ→1 T =
∞, yet limδ→1 δ T = 1.
While this equilibrium exhibits interesting features, only the resulting payoffs matter for the
analysis in the game in which all players are symmetrically informed. The payoff of a high-valuation
informed bidder can be computed from the strategy of always bidding u until period T − 1, and u+
in period T (assuming no informed bidder bid more than u until then). The payoff of this is then
V I (q) := (1 − δ)δ T FT (u)n

T +1

(ū − u) → 0

QT
To see this, note that by “telescoping” (22) for t = 0, . . . , T , we get 1 − q = t=0 Ft (u), which combined with
(24) gives FT (u) = 1 − qT as a function of T and q. The requirement that FT −1 (u) ≤ δ ≤ FT (u) yields for n > 1
10

nτ+1 −1

− τ +1

τ (τ +1)

T = max{τ : δ (n−1)2 n−1 ≥ 1 − q}, (for n = 1, following the same steps, T = max{τ : δ 2 ≥ 1 − q}) which pins
down qT . (Note that T → ∞, δ T → 1 as δ → 1 follows.) Eq. (23) for b = u then gives b̄t and so Ft (b).

31

as δ → 1. Writing out the payoff V U of the uninformed player is a little messier, and so is omitted
here. (See Online Appendix A for details, including an asymptotic expansion as δ → 1.) Note
that, from period T onward, in case no informed bidder separated so far, his continuation payoff is
FT (u)n (ū − u). Since δ T → 1 as δ → 1, it follows that V U (q) → (1 − q)n (ū − u): asymptotically,
the payoff to the uninformed agent is only positive in the event in which all his opponents have low
valuations. This is good for the auctioneer in this game, who thus gets (asymptotically) a maximal
revenue.

4.3

The Game of Symmetric Information

Building on these findings, we may now return to the game with symmetric information. In
particular, when is pooling an equilibrium outcome when all bidders’ valuations are equally unknown?
A pooling equilibrium must involve all bidders submitting the bid u (given Refinement A). The
payoff to a high-valuation bidder is then (ū − u)/(n + 1). The best deviation for a high-valuation
bidder involves bidding u+ , which garners (1−δ)(ū−u)+δV U (q)(ū−u), assuming that such a deviation
is ascribed to a high-valuation player, so that the game with one-sided incomplete information ensues.
Therefore, pooling is an equilibrium if and only if
1
≥ 1 − δ + δV U (q)/(ū − u).
n+1

(25)

Because V U is monotonically decreasing in q, and bounded above by ū − u, this gives a lower bound
q̄ o to the values of q for which such an equilibrium exists, and it is easy to see that q̄ o > q o .
Proposition 3 (Possibility of Pooling).

For all positive q, there exists δ, n such that for all δ > δ and n > n, a pooling Markov equilibrium

does exist with observable bids.
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Let us now focus on δ → 1. Because V U → (1 − q)n (ū − u), we get
q ≥ q̄ o → 1 − (n + 1)−1/n .

(26)

The left-hand side of (25) tends to what a high-valuation bidder can secure, if low-valuation bidders
do not bid more than u. Indeed, a high-valuation bidder can secure (1 − q)n (ū − u) by always bidding
u+ . Thus, the pooling equilibrium exists whenever it yields an individually rational payoff to the
high-valuation bidder. As we shall see, the same holds when only the winner’s bid is observed.
Recall that a separating equilibrium exists whenever q ≤ qo . This leaves us with the (non-empty)
interval (qo , q̄ o ). In that case, the equilibrium must involve semi-pooling. That is, the high-valuation
bidder puts positive probability on u, but he also continuously randomizes over some interval of
higher bids. In the event that all realized bids are u, bidders assign a growing probability to the
event that their opponents have a low valuation, so that, at some point, beliefs are such that a
separating equilibrium exists. In the supplementary Appendix, we show that such (not necessarily
unique) semi-pooling equilibria exist in this intermediate range of values for q, that a semi-pooling
equilibrium cannot end up in pooling in finite time, and that no such equilibrium can exist if q ≤ q o ,
i.e., it cannot exist when a separating equilibrium exists. Semi-pooling equilibria may also exist for
q ≥ q̄ o (that is, they co-exist with pooling equilibria); in fact, we prove in the Online Appendix A
that they do for any such prior when δ is sufficiently close to one, and that their revenue converges
to the revenue from the separating equilibrium (as δ → 1). We summarize this discussion in the
following theorem, see also Figure 2.
Theorem 3. A (Markov) equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, if
1. q ∈ [0, q o ], the unique equilibrium is separating;
2. q ∈ (q o , 1], no separating equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if
(a) q ∈ (q o , q̄ o ], all equilibria are semi-pooling;
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Figure 2: Markov equilibria in the observable case, as a function of q.
(b) q ∈ (q̄ o , 1], a pooling equilibrium exists.
To summarize, as δ → 1, the revenue converges to the optimal revenue (without reserve price) if
and only if q < 1 − (n + 1)−1/n , a decreasing function of n (that tends to 0 as n → ∞). Otherwise,
because bidders all use the same low bid, the auctioneer’s revenue is equal to u.

5

Winner-Only Observable Bids
Finally, we consider the case in which the bid and the identity of the winner are disclosed after

each auction.11 Again, in order to solve the game in which bidders have symmetric information, we
start with the case in which exactly one bidder is known to have a high valuation, because such
informational structures arise as continuations of the game with symmetric information.

5.1

The Game of One-Sided Incomplete Information

We already analyzed the game with one-sided incomplete information in the environment with
observable bids. There, every bid by the informed bidder strictly above u revealed that the bidder
has a high valuation. Thus, the evolution of the posterior belief had a simple binary structure. Either
the bids of the informed agent were all equal to u, and then the posterior declined from qt to qt+1 ,
or at least one of the informed bids was above u, and then uncertainty was resolved. In the current
11

While we assume so, it is not necessary that the winner’s identity be disclosed: if it is not, then a bidder who
has not won might not know whether the winning bids were submitted by the same, or different bidders; but if two
different bidders won with bids above u, it would still be the case that the two of them would commonly know that
there are two high-valuation bidders, and bids would then be ū from that point on.
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environment where only the winning bid is observable, the updating process depends on the realized
bid of the uninformed bidder. His bid, as long as it is winning, provides an upper bound for losing
bids. Therefore, the level of his bid determines the rate at which updating occurs. In contrast to the
observable case, it is therefore convenient to describe the strategies in terms of the commonly known
uninformed bidder’s posterior belief about the informed bidder’s valuation.
So suppose that a player, bidder 1, say, is known to have valuation ū. His opponents, on the
other hand, have privately known, and independently drawn valuations. The probability with which
each of these bidders has a high valuation is denoted q, as before. Bidder 1 is the uninformed bidder,
while the other bidders are informed. We begin with a few observations.
Because bidder 1’s valuation is known, he has nothing to lose from breaking any tie in his favor.
By winning, he not only gets an immediate reward, but he also increases the probability that the
game “goes on” (if another bidder outbids him, then it is known that there are two high-valuation
bidders, and so their bids are ū from then on). Thus, the uninformed bidder bids at least u+ .
Any informed high-valuation bidder has no incentive to bid u either. Such a bidder will never be
able to win more than one unit, because, by the previous observation, he needs to bid at least u+
to win, and doing so would reveal his valuation as well. So the best he can hope for is winning at a
price arbitrarily close to, but above u. So bidding, say, u + ε, for ε > 0 small enough, does strictly
better than bidding u. That is, denoting by FqI the common informed bidder’s distribution, given
that each of them is believed to have a high valuation with probability q, it holds that FqI (u) = 1 − q.
The bids of the uninformed bidder affect how much he learns about the informed bidders: he
is more likely to win with a higher bid, but such a bid is less informative about the probability
that at least one of the informed bidders has a high valuation. His bid distribution FqU is therefore
also indexed by the belief q. The uninformed bidder must randomize over some interval [u+ , bq ], for
some bid bq , given the common belief q. If he did play a pure strategy, the informed bidders would
outbid him by a very small amount, so that this could not be optimal. He cannot be the only player
submitting bids in this range, so the high-valuation informed bidder must do so as well.
We are now ready to solve for the equilibrium. Observe that by bidding bq , the uninformed bidder
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prevents any learning, since he wins for sure and only his own bid is observed. While in equilibrium
he randomizes in every period, one optimal strategy consists in making this same bid forever. At
the opposite end, by bidding u+ , he ensures that he learns perfectly his opponent’s type, since any
informed bidder with a high valuation bids strictly more. Hence, denoting by V U (q) the uninformed
bidder’s payoff given belief q, we have, for all q,
V U (q) = (1 − q)n (ū − u) = ū − bq .

(27)

Note that, by Bayes’ rule, the probability that the uninformed bidder assigns to any of his opponents
having a low valuation, conditional on winning with a bid b, is given by (1 − q)/FqI (b), where q is his
prior belief. Therefore, we must have, more generally,
(1 − q)n (ū − u) = FqI (b)n (1 − δ)(ū − b) + δ(1 − q)n (ū − u),
where we use the first equality of (27) to eliminate V U . It follows that
FqI (b)



ū − u
= (1 − q)
ū − b

1/n

.

(28)

Therefore, any informed bidder must bid as in the static auction (and as the losers in the repeated
auction with unobservable bids). Let us turn now to the informed bidders’ problem. By bidding bq ,
such a bidder wins once, and “ends” the game. So his payoff V I (q) must satisfy
V I (q) = (1 − δ)(ū − b̄q ) = (1 − δ)(1 − q)n (ū − u),

(29)

where we have used (27) to obtain the second equality. More generally, his payoff from bidding b
consists of two terms. With probability FqU (b)FqI (b)n−1 , he is the highest bidder and wins. If he
loses, then he only gets a positive continuation payoff if the uninformed bidder wins. That is, the
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uninformed bidder must bid some β > b, and all other informed bidders must bid less than β. Thus,
V I (q) = (1 − δ)(1 − q)n−1 (ū − u)

n−1
n

1
n

FqU (b)(ū − b) + δ

Z

bq

1
n

!

(ū − β) dFqU (β) ,

b

where we use (28) and (29). Plugging into (29) gives, for all b in the support of FqI ,
1
n

(1 − q)(ū − u) =

FqU (b)(ū

1
n

− b) + δ

Z

bq
b

1

(ū − β) n dFqU (β).

Because this is an identity with respect to b, and because the first and last terms are differentiable
in b, the second term must be as well. Taking derivatives yields
dFqU (b)/db
1
1
=
.
FqU (b)
n(1 − δ) ū − b
We can integrate, and use that FqU (bq ) = 1 (where b̄q is determined by (27)), to get

FqU (b) =



ū − u
(1 − q)
ū − b

1
 n1 ! 1−δ

,

(30)

1

where as usual FqU (u) = (1 − q) 1−δ is the probability attached to the bid u+ . The uninformed
bidder bids more aggressively than the informed bidders, as winning carries the additional benefit
of prolonging the game. This benefit becomes predominant as the discount factor is high, and the
uninformed bidder is then likely to make a bid that is near the upper end of the support. Equations
(28) and (30) characterize the equilibrium of the game with one-sided incomplete information, with
payoffs given by (27) and (29). We summarize this discussion in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 (Bidding with One-Sided Information and Winner-Only Observable Bids).
1. The informed bidders bid as in the static game, while the uninformed bidder bids more aggressively.
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2. The uninformed bidder’s bids decrease (weakly) over time. The time until the uninformed bidder
loses is finite (a.s.), but admits no finite bound.
It is informative to contrast the bidding behavior in the observable and the winner-only observable environment. Intuitively, in the observable bid regime, the informed bidders should bid more
cautiously as any bid above u will reveal that the bidder has a high valuation. The informed bidder
is therefore concerned that a bid higher than u would reveal his valuation without necessarily winning the object. The bidding strategy of an informed bidder in the observable environment is less
aggressive. In particular, from (22), with observable bids, the probability of a low bid is
FtI (u) =

1 − qt
> 1 − qt ,
1 − qt+1

which is larger than in the winner-only observable bid environment, in which it is given by FtI (u) =
1 − qt . In fact, given the characterization of the bidding distribution given by (23) and (28), it follows
that the upper bound of the bids is lower, and more generally that the bid distribution with observable
bids is first-order stochastically dominated by the bid distribution with winner-only observable bids.
Given the more defensive posture of the informed bidders in the observable environment, it then
follows that the uninformed bidder is also bidding less aggressively. In fact, the bid distribution of
the uninformed bidder in the observable environment is also first-order stochastically dominated by
the bid distribution with winner-only observable bids, as can be directly inferred by comparing (23)
with (30). As a result, the revenue is higher in the winner-only observable case.12

5.2

The Game of Symmetric Information

We start with the necessary and sufficient conditions for a pooling equilibrium to exist. Assume
all bidders submit the bid u with probability one. By doing so, a high-valuation bidder gets (ū −
This is immediate from the expected payoffs, given that both auctions are efficient. V U achieves the obvious
lower bound on the uninformed bidder’s payoff in the winner-only observable case (see (27)), so it is lower than in
the observable case. Similarly, the informed bidder’s payoff is lower in the winner-only observable case (compare the
upper end of the bid supports in the initial period, which determine the informed bidder’s revenue).
12
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u)/(n + 1). By bidding u+ instead, which is the best alternative, he gets
(1 − δ)(ū − u) + δV U (q) = (1 − δ)(ū − u) + δ(1 − q)n (ū − u),

(31)

where the equality uses (27). We can then establish the following result.
Proposition 5 (Possibility of Pooling).

For all positive q, there exists δ, n such that for all δ > δ and n > n, a pooling Markov equilibrium
does exist with winner-only observable bids.

By comparing the two payoff streams above, we see that pooling is an equilibrium whenever
1
≥ 1 − δ + δ(1 − q)n ,
n+1

(32)

i.e. the belief q should exceed some threshold q w . It is easy to see that q w > q̄ o .13 Note that, as
δ → 1,
q w → 1 − (n + 1)−1/n ,

(33)

the same threshold as with observable bids.
Consider now a separating equilibrium, i.e. assume that, in the initial period, all high-valuation
bidders submit bids that are at least u+ . The bid distribution Fq on [u, b̄q ] must then satisfy





Z b
1−q
1−q
U
I
+δ
nF (β)n−1 dFq (β) =
1−
1−
Fq (b) (1 − δ)(ū − b) + δV
V
Fq (b)
F
(β)
q
b
n

(1 − δ)(ū − b̄) + δV U (q),

where the two terms of the left-hand side are the payoffs from winning and losing with a bid b > u,
This is because the uninformed bidder’s payoff in the game with observable bids, V U , exceeds (1 − q)n (a lower
bound to his payoff). Because V U is decreasing in q, and (32) and (25) only differ by a term ((1 − q)n replacing V U (q)
in the winner-only observable case), the result follows.
13
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and the right-hand side is this payoff computed for b = b̄. Simplifying (using (27) and (29)) gives
n

n

Fq (b) (ū − b) + δn(1 − q) (ū − u)

Z

b

b

dFq (β)
= ū − b.
Fq (β)

Since dFq (β)/Fq (β) = d ln Fq (β), we obtain, using Fq (u) = 1 − q,
ū − b
ū − u



Fq (b)
1−q

n

= 1 + δ ln



Fq (b)
1−q

n

,

(34)

Equation (34) determines Fq . A closed-form solution is given in terms of the (branch -1 of the)
Lambert function W−1 , i.e.
1/n
 −1/δ

e
(ū − b)
δ(ū − u)
,
W−1 −
Fq (b) = (1 − q) −
ū − b
δ(ū − u)
and the largest bid is bq = ū−(1−q)n (1−δn ln(1−q))(ū−u). Note that this initial bid distribution is
the same as in the unobservable case! In fact, the continuation payoffs from winning and from losing
are identical as well. In particular, the continuation payoff from winning is independent of the level
of the winning bid in the winner-observable environment, as it is the unobservable environment. It
also means that a high-valuation bidder makes the same overall payment for winning in all periods
by submitting the highest bid in the bidding support in all periods. Note also that bidding supports
coincide for later periods. Thus, his payoff, and given that the equilibrium is efficient, the revenue,
is the same in both separating equilibria. The similarities in the payoffs (and the strategies) in
the winner-only observable bid and the unobservable bid environment can be traced back to the
similarities in the players’ information. In either game form, the winning seller does not know
whether his competitors have low or high valuation, and he does not know their past bids either.
The losing bidders in either game form know that they face a high-value bidder. In addition, in
the winner-only observable environment they know the winner’s past bids. In either game form, the
losing bidders have the same opportunities, namely to win once against the winning bidder.
In fact, a stronger equivalence holds: the unconditional distribution of bids is the same in the
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unobservable case as in the separating equilibrium of the winner-only observable case.14 We should
however emphasize that the equilibrium play across the two environments is quite distinct. In the
unobservable environment, the bidders randomize only initially and then pursue a deterministic policy
as a function of their initial randomized choice, whereas in the winner-only observable environment
bidders keep on randomizing in all periods, until all uncertainty is resolved.
Note that the separating equilibrium exists for all parameters. If the other high-valuation bidders
separate, it is strictly better for a high-valuation bidder to bid u+ rather than u. In either case, the
bidder only wins if all the opponents have low valuation. If they do not, both bids are equivalent. If
they all do, then bidding u+ is strictly better than u, for by making the former bid, the bidder learns
that all other bidders have low valuation, and so he always wins at the price u+ .
If the prior belief is high enough for pooling equilibria to exist, semi-pooling equilibria also exist,
in which high-valuation bidders assign positive probability to u, but also continuously randomize
over some range (u, b̄q ). The Online Appendix A provides an exhaustive analysis of such equilibria.15
Such equilibria must converge (in finite time or not) to pooling, so that the belief must be above
the threshold ensuring existence of pooling equilibria (characterized by (32)), and their revenue is
bounded away from the revenue of the separating equilibrium. The next theorem summarizes these
findings, as does Figure 3.
Theorem 4. A (Markov) equilibrium always exists. Furthermore,
1. A unique separating equilibrium always exists. If q < q w , this is the unique equilibrium;
2. If q > q w , a (unique) pooling equilibrium exists, as well as semi-pooling equilibria.
The informational environment of the winner-only observable bids leads to qualitative characteristics of the equilibria between the unobservable and the observable environment. As in the unob14

This follows by computation. The unconditional distribution in the winner-only observable case in a given period
is a convolution over those distributions in earlier periods, as earlier bids affect beliefs. Details available upon request.
15
For each prior q ≥ q w , countably many semi-pooling equilibria exist. Exactly one such equilibrium involves an
infinite sequence of distinct posterior beliefs (conditional on the highest bid being u), which converges to q w ; all other
semi-pooling equilibria specify switching at an arbitrary time from this sequence to the belief q w at which pooling
ensues. The later the switch, the lower the revenue.
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Figure 3: Markov equilibria in the winner-only observable case, as a function of q.
servable environment, a separating equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for all values of q, δ, and n.
But as in the observable environment, a pooling equilibrium also exists for every prior probability q
as long as δ and n are sufficiently large.
To conclude, the revenue comparison between observable bids and winner-only observable bids is
not clear-cut, shrouded in part by the multiplicity of equilibria. There is a sense in which winner-only
observable auctions make bidders more aggressive. To wit, the threshold above which pooling exists
is higher (q w > q̄ o ), and a separating equilibrium always exists, unlike in the observable case. In
addition, the comparison is unambiguous when information is one-sided. But this is precisely what
mitigates aggressive bidding in the winner-only observable case: true, bidding aggressively and failing
to win does not lead to costly information revelation in that case, but if revelation does occur, more
aggressive bidding in the one-sided case ensues, which holds up aggressive bidding in the first place.
The success of the winner-only observable format in raising revenue, and so depressing payoffs in the
one-sided case backfires, putting a damper on bidding when information is still symmetric.

6

Discussion and Conclusion
The objective of the present paper was to investigate the role of disclosure policies in the context

of repeated auctions and procurements. We compared the minimal disclosure policy, namely unobservable bids, with the maximal disclosure policy, namely observable bids. We also considered an
intermediate form of disclosure policy, in which only the winning bid was disclosed. We now discuss
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the robustness of the analysis (and its result) with respect to a number of natural generalization and
variations of the stylized model.
Finite vs. Infinite Horizon: So far, we have analyzed the bidding behavior for all disclosure environments in an infinite horizon setting. It is then natural to ask whether we might not have obtained
similar results in a finite horizon setting, perhaps even in a two period setting with considerably
less effort. We thus briefly discuss how the equilibrium analysis would be affected by imposing a
finite horizon (Details in a Supplementary Appendix B available from the authors). The resulting
comparison is also informative as much of the literature discussed in the introduction obtains results
for the special case of a finite horizon with two periods. To anticipate the discussion below, we
find that the assumption of finite horizon crucially misses the possibility of pooling (or even semipooling) equilibria that arise naturally under infinite horizon, but vanish under finite horizon. As
we established that the pooling equilibria only arise in the observable or the winner-only observable
bid environment our conclusion regarding the benefits of disclosing bid information therefore differ
markedly from the previously literature, and lead us to suggest that disclosing past bids may be
detrimental to the revenue to the seller.
We begin our discussion with the case of unobservable bids. Here we derived the Markov equilibrium in the infinite horizon model. The Markov equilibrium for a finite horizon (with or without
discounting) is in fact simply the truncated version of the infinite horizon model and all the results,
in particular Proposition 1 on the impossibility of pooling and Theorem 1 on the characterization of
the separating equilibrium remain valid in their exact form.
However, the restriction to a finite horizon does impact the bidding behavior with observable
bids. It remains true that is difficult to obtain a separating equilibrium, and the critical threshold q o
remains valid, but importantly a (complete) pooling equilibrium as in Theorem 3 now fails to exist
for any finite horizon. To see this, suppose in the penultimate period both types were to bid u. Then
the beliefs would not be updated at all, remaining at the common prior q. Now if a high value bidder
were to deviate to bid u+ , then he would win the object for sure while beliefs about all other bidders
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would remain at the ex ante prior q. As we have already shown, a static auction with such one-sided
information involves the same unconditional distribution of bids and same expected payoff as the
symmetric information one. So deviating is unambiguously a better strategy and therefore imply
the impossibility of pooling. Thus any finite horizon model would neglect the existence of pooling
equilibria, and thus would fail to recognize the revenue gain from unobservable bids.
With observable bids by the winner, the impossibility to sustain pooling equilibria remains, and
thus Proposition 5 ceases to hold. In fact, even the semi-pooling equilibria cease to exist when only
the winning bid is observable. The difference to the observable bid environment is that now the
losers’ bids are private, and thus bidding u+ does not risk to reveal one’s type when another high
type bidder made the winning bid. This further undermines the ability of bidders to disguise their
valuation in a semi-pooling equilibrium. Hence the only remaining equilibrium is the separating
equilibrium.
The Role for Reserve Prices: We have argued that the disclosure environment impacts the
revenue of the seller, and by consequence the net utility of the bidder in an important way. But
information is only one of many instruments available to the seller to increase his revenue, and thus
we might wonder whether a more traditional instrument such as a reserve price would not be a more
powerful instrument than the disclosure policy. We therefore briefly analyze how the use of reserve
prices would impact the analysis of the disclosure regimes. For the purpose of the discussion here, we
shall restrict our attention to optimally chosen stationary reserve prices, and thus will not consider
reserve prices that can change over time.
In a static setting, we know that the revenue of a standard first price auction is generally not
optimal, and can be increased by suitably chosen reserve prices. In the current binary setting only
a reserve price equal to the high valuation can possible increase the revenue. Indeed with a high
reserve price, the seller can extract all the surplus from the bidders but faces the risk that none of
them meets the reserve price. By comparing the revenue of the auction format with and without a
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reserve price, we can easily establish that it is optimal to impose a high reserve price if and only if
qr ≥

u
.
(n + 1)u − nu

(35)

After all, we established in Section 2.4 that the revenue without a reserve price equals the revenue
of the second price auction. Now, the above inequality is more likely to get satisfied when (a) q is
higher, (b) n is larger, and (c) the difference u − u is larger.
With this benchmark from the static setting, we can now understand the impact of the reserve
prices in the dynamic setting. We shall restrict our attention to the limiting case as δ → 1 to be able
to directly use our previous results. By Corollary 2, we then know that with unobservable bids, the
expected revenue tends to the revenue of the static auction. By contrast, with observable bids, we
know from Theorem 3 that a pooling equilibrium exists, and from condition (26) we know that as
δ → 1, the critical threshold converges to:
q̄ o = 1 − (n + 1)−1/n .

(36)

Moreover, Proposition 5 establishes for winner-only observable bids that as δ → 1, the threshold for
the pooling equilibrium q w converges to q̄ o as well, see (33). Thus, we can conclude that for all q
such that q̄ o < q < q r , the optimal policy would be to not impose reserve prices and to not disclose
any bidding information. After all, the flow revenue in any pooling equilibrium is limited to the
low valuation u. By contrast in the unobservable bid environment, it is either the expected value
of the second order statistic, which is strictly larger than u. A comparison between the two critical
thresholds q r and q̄ o establishes that there is always a range of values [u, u] such that the imposition
of high reserve price u is not optimal for a range of prior probabilities q.
Proposition 6 (Irrelevance of Reserve Prices).
For every n > 1 there exists a sufficiently large ratio u/u < 1 such that q̄ o < q r .
Proof. We compare the two thresholds q r and q̄ o given by (35) and (36). We observe that q r is
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increasing in u and q̄ o is independent of u. We solve for
1 − (n + 1)−1/n =

or

u
(n + 1)u − nu



1
n − 1
(n
+
1)
(n
+
1)
u


,
=
1
u
n
(n + 1) (n + 1) − 1 + 1

and the right-hand side is evidently smaller than 1 for all n > 1.

The ratio of u and u appears as it represents the relative loss the seller incurs by relying on a
competitive bid from the low valuation bidder u rather than imposing a high reserve price equal to
the high valuation u. Clearly for u = 0, a high reserve price is always optimal, but eventually as the
competitive distance between the low valuation and high valuation decreases, a high reserve price
forgoes too much revenue from the low valuation bidders.
We conclude by briefly commenting on the role of some of the restrictions of our model.
Private vs. Common Values: Throughout, we have assumed that bidders have private values.
If values had a common element, we suspect that some information disclosure might be desirable.
Recall that, from the literature on static auctions, revenue increases in the amount of information
that is being disclosed, as it allows bidders to fine-tune their bids. The same should be true in
sequential auctions. As information about other bidders’ bids are disclosed, information percolates
that might help bidders refine their estimate of the value of the good, and this might mitigate the
detrimental effect of public information that has been discussed in this paper. Of course, the latter
effect might completely inhibit learning: if the equilibrium is pooling, no information about other
bidders’ information will ever be transmitted, and learning cannot take place.
Persistent vs. Changing Values: Throughout, we have assumed that values never change. This
is an obvious simplification. Its technical convenience is easy to grasp: if values could change over
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time, in the unobservable case, a loser who eventually wins could no longer be sure that his opponent
has a high-valuation, and thus, that his opponent knows that he has a high-valuation as well. Perhaps
his eventual win came about because the previous winner’s valuation dropped. The impossibility of
a pooling equilibrium remains valid, however, as high-valuation bidders have the same incentive to
break ties in their favor. The impact of changing values on bidding dynamics is intuitively ambiguous.
On one hand, it makes the winner less cautious about lowering his bid, because losing does not imply
that the continuation payoff will be zero forever (values will not remain persistently high). On the
other hand, the probability that the losers have a low valuation is bounded below (as their value
might change from one period to the next), and this dampens the winner’s incentive to lower his bid.
Binary Values: We assume throughout that each bidder has either a low or a high value for the
object. The binary structure of the possible valuations was particularly helpful in the construction of
the equilibrium in the case of unobservable bids (and it was necessary to get unique predictions in the
other versions). More precisely, it allowed us to conclude that the bids would jump immediately to
the high value after the past winning bidder lost for the first time, and would thereafter stay constant
at the high value. With a finite number or a continuum of values, the analysis would become more
intricate. With a finite number of values the resolution of uncertainty among two competing bidders
with distinct values may require more than one period in which the identity of the winner switches.
With two values, any winning bid above the low value identifies a high value bidder. With more
than one value above the lowest value, the separation between adjacent values ins unlikely to occur
in a single event, as it would open the possibility to delay an aggressive bid by a finite number of
periods to mimic a lower value type, and hence separation will be slower and with some cost in terms
of the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation. As we already know from the two-period analysis of
Landsberger, Rubinstein, Wolfstetter, and Zamir (2001), there is no hope in finding a closed-form
expression for the strategies if values are drawn from an interval. Furthermore, because from one
period to the next, the winner decreases his bid by some finite amount, there would be no common
knowledge of valuations once bid trajectories cross. We believe that ours is the first paper to explicitly
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solve for a Markov equilibrium in a game in which higher-order beliefs matter, and we hope that it
will trigger further developments that will ultimately allow to study such richer environments.
We should emphasize that we believe that the thrust of the argument, the impossibility of a pooling
equilibrium with unobservable bids, and the possibility of a pooling bid with observable bids would
remain to hold with finitely many or a continuum of values. After all, if we take u and u as the lowest
and the highest valuations (among a continuum), then a pooling equilibrium leads to a flow payoff
(u − u) / (n + 1) while the flow payoff from the efficient separating equilibrium is (1 − q)n / (u − u),
all evaluated from the point of view of the bidder with the highest valuations. Now, as Proposition 2
established for binary values, for every q, there exists n such that the separating equilibrium ceases
to exist, while the pooling equilibrium survives.
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7

Appendix
We generalize here the analysis given in the text to the case with n + 1 bidders. The loser’s bid

distribution in period t ≥ 1 is denoted Ft . The distribution of the highest losing bid is given by (Ft )n ,
and most of the analysis from the winner’s point of view is identical to the case n = 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. The high-valuation winner’s value function must satisfy the optimality equation

Vt (b) = max
β




Ft (β)n
((1 − δ)(ū − β) + δVt+1 (β)) ,
Ft−1 (b)n

where b is the bid the winner made in period t − 1 (as before, we attempt to solve for an equilibrium
in which the equilibrium bid is a summary statistic for the entire information of a player). Define
Yt (b) := Ft−1 (b)n Vt (b) for all t ≥ 1. Then Yt (b) = maxβ {Ft (β)n (1 − δ)(ū − β) + δYt+1 (β)}, from
which it is clear that, since the right-hand side is independent of b, the winner is indifferent over all
bids in the relevant interval, and Yt is independent of b. It follows that, for all t ≥ 1, and for some
constant ϕt ≥ 0, Ft (b)n =

ϕt
.
ū−b

Since our purpose is to construct an equilibrium in which only the

low type bidder bids u, we further have (1 − q)n = Ft (u)n =
constant ϕt , so that
Ft (b) = (1 − q)



ū − u
ū − b

ϕt
,
ū−u

1/n

from which we can solve for the

.

(37)

This distribution being independent of t, the loser makes a bid that is independent of t, ∀t ≥ 1.

Proof of Lemma 2. Let us define Xt (b) as the continuation payoff of a player with a high valuation
ū who lost in the first period and always bids b. Then

Xt (b) = max {Pr[i wins in period t with β](1 − δ)(ū − β) + δXt+1 (β)} .16
β

16

As in the case of two players, this is an abuse of notation, because the continuation payoff is a function of the
latest bid β only if this latest bid is the most informative one; however, this is necessarily the case if bidder i does
not submit a bid strictly lower than the lowest bid for which he knows he will lose for sure, and this is without loss of
generality. Note further that, for any higher bid β, his optimization problem is as if he had bid β throughout.
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We do not condition on player i having always lost before, or the winner having always won (i.e., it
could be that the game is “over”and i might not know about it). The choice only matters if those
two events obtain, but so maximizing the conditional or unconditional payoff is equivalent. Let

pt (b, β) := Pr[i wins in period t with β and bid b in all previous periods],

given that he always bid b before, and lost in the initial period. First-order conditions give
δ
d
′
pt (b, β)(ū − β) − pt (b, β) +
Xt+1
(β) = 0,
dβ
1−δ
while the envelope theorem states that
d
Xt′ (b)
= pt (b, β)(ū − β).
1−δ
db

(38)

Combining gives, for t ≥ 2 (remember that b = β then)



d
d
pt (b, b) + δ pt+1 (b, b) (ū − b) − pt (b, b) = 0.
dβ
db

(39)

We must now solve for the probabilities pt (b, β). Fix some player i who lost in the initial period
with a bid b. Let Gt denote the unconditional bid distribution of the winner in period t (we do not
condition on the fact that player i lost in the initial period with a particular bid b). Also, given t,
define the function β by Gt (b) = Gt−1 (β(b)). That is, if the initial winner bids b in period t, he must
have bid β(b) in the previous period. Suppose now that player i bid b in all periods up to t − 1.
What are his odds of winning for the first time in t with a bid b − ε, for small ε > 0? First, the bid
b − ε must be the highest bid among the losing bids, which occurs with probability F (b)n−1 . Second,
the winner’s previous bid must have been in the interval [b, β(b − ε)]: if it were lower, i would have

50

won before; if it were higher, i would not win in period t. So the probability he wins is
F (b − ε)n−1 (Gt−1 (β(b − ε)) − Gt−1 (b)) = F (b − ε)n−1 (Gt (b − ε) − Gt−1 (b)).

(40)

Let us now consider instead the case in which he increases his bid to b + ε in period t. What is the
probability that he then wins in that period? The probability is then

F (b + ε)

n−1

Z

β(b+ε)

gt−1 (x)dx +

b+ε

Z

b+ε

F (x)n−1 gt−1 (x)dx.

b

Indeed, either the winner bid x in the range [b, b + ε] in period t − 1, and for i to win in t, he must
have won in t − 1 (i.e. the others bid below x, which imply that they are also outbid by i in t), or he
bid x in the range [b + ε, β(b + ε)], and all that is needed then is that the other initial losers bid no
more than b + ε. This probability can be rewritten as

F (b + ε)

n−1

(Gt (b + ε) − Gt−1 (b + ε)) +

Z

b+ε

F (x)n−1 gt−1 (x)dx.

(41)

b

As expected, these probabilities and their derivatives with respect to ε coincide for ε = 0, so
pt (b, b) = F (b)n−1 (Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b)),

(42)

d
pt (b, b) = F (b)n−1 gt (b) + (n − 1)f (b)F (b)n−2 (Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b)).
dβ

(43)

We also get, from (40) or (41),
d
pt (b, b) = −F (b)n−1 gt−1 (b).
(44)
db


d
d
pt (b, b) + δ db
pt+1 (b, b) (ū − b) − pt (b, b) = 0, and plugging in the value for pt and its
We have dβ
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derivatives from (42)–(44) gives

F (b)n−1 gt (b) + (n − 1)f (b)F (b)n−2 (Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b)) − δF (b)n−1 gt (b)) (ū − b)

−F (b)n−1 (Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b)) = 0.

We can then eliminate the higher powers of F and obtain


f (b)
(Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b)) (ū − b) − (Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b)) = 0,
(1 − δ) gt (b) + (n − 1)
F (b)

(45)

a difference-differential equation to be solved for Gt given Gt−1 . We further eliminate f (b) /F (b) by
observing that from (37),


f (b)
F (b)

=

1 1
.
n u−b

Plugging into (45),


n−1 1
(Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b)) (ū − b) − (Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b)) = 0,
(1 − δ) gt (b) +
n u−b

(46)

or


1
(1 − δ) gt (b) (u − b) − (Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b)) = 0.
n

(47)

The derivation of G1 follows then exactly the same steps as in the text, giving
1
(1 − δ)g1 (b)(ū − b) =
n

G1 (b) −



γ
ū − b

 n1 !

,

where γ := (1 − q)n (ū − u), g1 is the derivative of G1 and G1 (ū − γ) = 1. For t ≥ 2,

(1 − δ)gt (b)(ū − b) =

1
(Gt (b) − Gt−1 (b)) ,
n

with Gt (ū − γ) = 1. Set y := (ū − b)/γ, Ht (y) := Gt (b), so (1 − δ)nyht (y) + Ht(y) − Ht−1(y) = 0, t ≥ 2,
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1

and (1 − δ)nyh1 (y) + H1 (y) − y − n = 0, where Ht (1) = 1, t ≥ 1. The solution is

τ
t
X
1 − δ τ −t
ln y
y −1/n
−1/(1−δ)n
+y
,
Ht (y) =
τ
!
(1
−
δ)n
δt
τ =0

(48)

that is, in terms of the distribution Gt ,

Gt (b) =

1
(1−q)
δt




1
1 τ
 n1 "
 n1 # 1−δ
 n1 !− 1−δ


t
τ −t
X
1−δ
ū − u
ū − u
 ,
ln (1 − q) ū − u
+ (1 − q)
ū − b
ū − b
τ
!
ū
−
b
τ =0

which establishes the lemma.

Proof of Theorem 1. It remains to determine F0 , the initial bid distribution. The payoff of bidding b
for a player with a high-valuation is given by F0 (b)n (ū−b)+δY1 (b)/(1−δ)+δX1 (b)/(1−δ), where Y1 (b)
is the (unconditional) continuation payoff after winning with an initial bid of b, evaluated from the
second period onward, and X1 (b) is the (unconditional) continuation payoff from losing after an initial
bid of b, evaluated from the second period onward. As in the case n = 1, Y1 (b)/(1−δ) = (1−q)n (ū−u)
is a constant. Further, from the envelope theorem,
X1′ (b)/(1 − δ) =

d
p1 (b, β)(ū − β) = −nF0 (b)n−1 f0 (b)(ū − β),
db

where f0 is the density of the distribution F0 . From F0 (b) = F1 (β) = (1 − q)
for ū − β in terms of F0 . Plugging this into the previous formula, we get
X1′ (b)/(1 − δ) = −n



ū−u
ū−β

n

, we can solve

f0 (b)
(1 − q)n (ū − u).
F0 (b)

Integrating then yields X1 (b)/(1−δ) = −n(1−q)n (ū−u) ln F0 (b)+C0 , for some constant C0 . Because
the payoff of bidding b must be independent of b over the support, we thus obtain that (substituting
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for X1 and Y1 )
F0 (b)n (ū − b) − nδ(1 − q)n (ū − u) ln F0 (b) = K0 ,

(49)

for some constant K0 that is independent of b. By using the fact that F0 (u+ ) = 1 − q, we get K0 by
plugging b = u+ , and so K0 = (ū − u)(1 − q)n (1 − nδ ln(1 − q)). By plugging b = b̄, where b̄ denotes
the upper extremity of the support of F0 , we get that b̄ = ū−K0 . This and (49) uniquely characterize
F0 , and the closed-form solution follows from standard properties of the Lambert function.
So far, the equilibrium strategies have only been described on path. What happens after histories
that are off the equilibrium path? Note first that there are no non-trivial deviations in the initial
period: the high-valuation bidder has nothing to gain from bidding more than the highest bid in the
support of his opponents’ distribution, nor from bidding less. For the latter, observe that bidding
u+ strictly dominates bidding u: high-valuation opponents bid more anyway; so it only makes a
difference in the event that they all have low valuations, but in that event, it is better for him to
break the tie in his favor. Therefore, we may focus on deviations after the initial period. Consider the
winner first. Given that the losers make constant bids, the most informative bid b that the winner
has made from period 1 to period t, given some arbitrary private history of his, is the lowest bid
that he has made so far. Therefore, his beliefs are as if he had made this bid b in period t, and since
the winner’s equilibrium strategy is onto (i.e. for every bid b in the support, there is a history for
which this bid b is the equilibrium bid in period t), we may specify that he then behaves as if he had
followed all along the equilibrium strategy that leads to bid b in period t (in fact, this specification is
implied by the Markov assumption). The situation for a high-valuation loser i is similar: because the
winner’s bids follow some decreasing trajectory, what matters is, given the private history of bidder
i, what is the highest lower bound b that he assigns to the winner’s bid in period t? Then bidder
i’s problem is identical to the one he would face had he followed the equilibrium strategy leading
to a bid of b in period t, and the Markov assumption then implies that, whatever private history
he actually has, he behaves from that period onward according to this equilibrium strategy (i.e., he
submits the constant bid b from then on).
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Finally, as the reader might recall, the optimality equations for the winner and loser implicitly
assumed that bids were chosen in a range ensuring that this bid would be more informative than
the previous ones. For the winner, this means that the new bid β is no higher than the previous bid
b that he submitted; plainly, given that the losers make constant bids, higher bids are suboptimal
(because any bid β ≥ b is a winning bid anyway). For the loser, this means that the new bid β is
not strictly lower than the maximal bid that ensures that, given the previous bid b he submitted,
and the winner’s equilibrium strategy, the loser is guaranteed to lose again. Plainly again, making
any lower bid cannot constitute a profitable deviation. By construction then, there are no profitable
deviations. This completes the description of the separating equilibrium.
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